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PEOPLE V. WARD: TOWARD A RECONSTRUCTION
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ILLINOIS
Robert G. Spector*
The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Ward, adopted a new
evidentiary rule governing expert opinions. The Rule is based on
Federal Rule 703 and allows the expert to form an opinion based
on matters not in evidence. In this Article, Professor Spector
considers what types of inadmissible data may be relied on by
the expert and whether exclusionary rules should bear on the
application of the Rule. Suggestions for implementation also
will be made.
[A] psychiatrist is considered qualified to give testimony on
mental conditions, but a court overrides the psychiatrist's pro-
fessional judgment as to the proper tools for use in diagnosing
those conditions. There appears to be no support for this anom-
aly in either medical or legal precedent.'
Unfortunately, abundant support for this "anomaly" does exist
in legal precedent. The legal system's use of expert advice always
has been tempered by severe restrictions upon how that advice
may be presented in a courtroom. Courts have declared that an
expert's opinion must not "invade the province of the jury;"2
must not be a "guess or conjecture;"3 must, in some cases, be
* Associate Professor, Loyola School of Law (Chicago); B.S., University of Wisconsin;
J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School.
1. People v. Noble, 42 lll.2d 425, 435, 248 N.E.2d 96, 102 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 308 Ill. 242, 139
N.E. 395 (1923). At one point in time an extensive case literature existed on the problem
of identification of the ultimate issue in a case. Those cases held it was improper to ask a
witness whether a person could have seen or heard the danger causing the accident.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. O'Sullivan, 143 Ill. 48, 32 N.E. 398 (1892). However, it was
proper to ask whether a person could have heard a warning bell. Barnett v. Chicago City
Ry., 167 Ill.App. 87 (1st Dist. 1912). This objection received its final death knell in
Merchant Nat'l Bank v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 49 Ill.2d 118, 273 N.E.2d 809 (1971), where
the supreme court allowed expert testimony on the question of whether a railroad crossing
was safe. The court noted that since the trier of fact is not required to accept the expert's
opinion, the opinion could not possibly invade the province of the jury. Thus, for example,
in a malpractice case it is now perfectly correct for an expert to testify that the defendant's
acts constituted negligence. McCallister v. del Castillo, 18 Ill.App.3d 1041, 310 N.E.2d 474
(4th Dist. 1974).
3. See, e.g., Marshall v. First American Nat'l Bank, 91 Ill.App.2d 47, 53, 233 N.E.2d
430, 434 (5th Dist. 1968), quoting Kane v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 310 Ill.App. 524,
530, 34 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1st Dist. 1941).
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based on assumptions stated in hypothetical questions;4 and may
not be based upon the opinion of another expert.'
In addition, an opinion could not be based on matters which
were not in evidence or were not introducible into evidence., If the
expert's opinion was based on facts not in evidence, the opinion
was deemed valueless; if the trier of fact could not find the
"facts" the expert used, it could not believe an opinion based on
those "facts." 7 This reasoning, of course, is fallacious. Virtually
all opinions are based on knowledge that cannot be proved inde-
pendently at trial.8 The traditional rule's main purpose, however,
was to prevent the introduction of hearsay information at trial
through the expert's opinion.
The cost of accomplishing this purpose has been great. Both
experts and lawyers have criticized' the traditional restrictions
for reducing the elicitation of expert testimony to a turgid and
stilted performance.'" Substantial time and effort is wasted in
presenting various witnesses whose sole purpose is placing into
evidence the data considered by the expert. As a result, the tech-
nical problems underlying the law suit often are left unresolved."
4. See, e.g., People v. Hester, 39 1Il.2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968).
5. Any contention that this was the rule in Illinois was dispelled by People v. Noble,
42 Ill.2d 425, 248 N.E.2d 96 (1969).
6. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §15, at 34 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK];
Mineral Point R.R. v. Keep, 22 Ill. 9 (1859); Pritchett v. Steinker Trucking Co., 108 Ill.
App.2d 371, 247 N.E.2d 923 (4th Dist. 1969).
7. McCoRMicK, supra note 6, §15, at 34.
8. Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1962) provides:
Thus, a doctor, in testifying on the cause of a patient's condition, for example,
might refer and rely upon what he had observed in examining the patient, upon
what the patient has told him of his symptoms, and upon the results of medical
tests performed upon the patient. He might add to the information which he
has learned in medical texts, and even material that has come to him as part of
the ensuing litigation.
9. Hulbert, Psychiatric Testimony in Probate Proceedings, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
448 (1935); Roberts, Some Observations on the Forensic Psychiatrist, 1965 Wis. L. REV.
240 (1965).
10. This is particularly true of the hypothetical question method of eliciting testimony.
While originally an ingenious device permitting experts who had no first-hand knowledge
to aid the fact-finder, it has become a time-consuming process which has been abused.
The method has been characterized as "the most horrific and grotesque wen on the fair
face of justice." L. HAND, NEW YORK BAR ASSOCIATION LECTURES AND LEGAL Topics 1921-
22 (1922).
11. Rules of evidence, developed years ago and applicable supposedly to all
witnesses, absorbed with questions of admissibility and not with proof, persua-
sion, and the discovery of truth are being imposed in many jurisdictions to
1977]
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People v. Ward: A TENTATIVE STEP
The Illinois Supreme Court has taken a step toward a more
realistic approach regarding what is permissible as the basis of an
expert opinion. In People v. Ward, ' the defendant, charged with
murder, raised the defense of temporary insanity. In rebuttal, the
state called a psychiatrist, the director of the Psychiatric Insti-
tute of the Circuit Court of Cook County, who testified that in
his opinion the defendant was sane at the time of the homicide.
The factors relied upon by the psychiatrist in formulating this
opinion included: psychological results compiled by a psycholo-
gist connected with the Psychiatric Institute, an examination of
the defendant supervised by the testifying psychiatrist but ac-
tually conducted by another psychiatrist, and reports from other
institutions concerning the defendant's behavior while an inmate
of those institutions. No attempt was made by the prosecution to
introduce this material into evidence.
The defendant was convicted and this verdict was affirmed by
the appellate court. 3 Although the defendant had not objected to
the opinion at the trial, and actually had urged that the reports
underlying the psychiatrist's opinion be admitted, the supreme
court proceeded to discuss the question whether the psychiatrist's
opinion could be based on non-admitted factors. 4 The court
noted that the factors used by the psychiatrist normally would
not have been admissible. 5 Prior Illinois cases had held that it
prevent that free and full use of basic facts necessary to reach a correct and just
solution of a case involving a medical issue.
Rheingold, supra note 8, at 475.
12. 61 Ill.2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975).
13. People v. Ward, 19 Ill.App.3d 833, 313 N.E.2d 314 (1st Dist. 1974).
14. The Ward opinion is open to several different interpretations. For example, the data
relied upon by the psychiatrist would have been admissible had it been offered with the
proper witnesses. See People v. Noble, 42 Ill.2d 425, 248 N.E.2d 96 (1969). Thus, Ward
could be construed as holding only that the expert's opinion is admissible when the data
underlying the opinion would have been admissible if properly offered, and if the defen-
dant failed to object. Under this reading, the second part of the opinion discussing the
admissibility of an opinion based on non-admissible data is dicta.
15. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 236b provides that hospital and medical records are not admissible
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 236b applies only to civil
cases. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §115-5(c)(1) (1975) applies to criminal cases. People v. Gauer,
7 IlI.App.3d 512, 288 N.E.2d 24 (2d Dist. 1972). It should be noted that the rule and statute
only provide that medical and hospital records are inadmissible as business records. It
does not make the data contained in records completely inadmissible. Thus, in Ward if
the psychologist had been present in court, he could have testified about the psychological
[Vol. 26:284
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was error to predicate an expert's opinion of sanity on records not
admitted into evidence.' 6
The court observed the trend in some jurisdictions away from
the rule that an expert must base an opinion on data admissible
in evidence,'7 and noted that the newly enacted Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 is contrary to the traditional rule.'" The court
quoted Rule 703 and its commentary with approval. Following
the Federal Rule, the court concluded that because the factors
used by the psychiatrist are factors normally utilized by psychia-
trists in arriving at an opinion on sanity, the opinion was admissi-
ble even though the underlying factors were not testified to di-
rectly by those administering the tests.'"
The breadth of the court's holding remains unsettled. At one
point the court seems to indicate that the holding may be re-
stricted to opinions regarding sanity based on the type of factors
present in the Ward case itself.20 However, the better view would
tests given the defendant. The psychiatrist could then have given an opinion based on the
psychologist's in-court testimony. The difficulty in Ward was that the psychologist's
testimony was contained in a non-admissible hospital record.
It should be noted also that hospital records may be admitted under other exceptions
to the hearsay rule such as past recollection recorded, Wolf v. Chicago, 78 Ill. App.2d 337,
223 N.E.2d 231 (1st Dist. 1966), or as admissions, Stewart v. DuPlessis, 42 Ill. App.2d 192,
191 N.E.2d 622 (1st Dist. 1963).
16. Specifically, the court refers to People v. Black, 367 Il. 209, 10 N.E.2d 801 (1937)
in which the defendant raised an insanity defense. On rebuttal, the state called a qualified
psychiatrist to testify that the defendant was sane. The psychiatrist admitted that his
opinion was based, among other things, upon the reports of social workers, psychiatric and
medical examinations, and psychological tests made and conducted by others. The court
held the admission of the opinion to be prejudicial error. See also Louisville, N. A. & Co.
Ry. v. Shires, 108 Ill. 617 (1884). Insofar as the Black case differs from Ward, the Black
opinion has been overruled. 61 Ill.2d at 568, 338 N.E.2d at 177.
17. See, e.g., People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 323 N.E.2d 169 (1974). However, a
relaxation of the rule has occurred in a few Illinois cases which have permitted an expert
to base an opinion on data not actually in evidence so long as this data would have been
admissible in evidence. See, e.g., People v. Gillespie, 24 Ill.App.3d 567, 321 N.E.2d 398
(2d Dist. 1974); Rivera v. Rockford Machine & Tool Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 641, 274 N.E.2d
828 (1st Dist. 1971).
18. FED. R. EvID. 703 [hereinafter cited as RuLz 703] provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence. (emphasis added by the Ward court)
19. 61 Ill.2d at 567, 338 N.E.2d at 176.
20. For these reasons we are of the opinion that insofar as People v. Black
applies to the admission of expert medical opinion as to an accused's sanity
19771
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be that the Ward opinion adopted Rule 703. In quoting the Rule,
the court italicized and emphasized the second sentence2 which
is not limited to sanity or even to medical expert opinion. Because
non-medical as well as medical experts normally rely on non-
evidentiary data in arriving at an opinion, there is no reason to
distinguish between the two with regard to what may constitute
the basis of their opinions.
The adoption of Rule 703 expands the data which can be used
to form expert opinions. However, in an attempt to promote other
considerations, the law of evidence may restrict the use of certain
data even though a given profession considers it reliable. 2 This
Article first will examine the types of data which may be used by
the expert under the new Rule.23 It will then consider whether
exclusionary rules should be applied to exclude opinions based on
data which the expert considers reliable but the legal community
does not favor. Finally, it will consider methodology and sugges-
tions for the implementation of Rule 703.
based, in part, on medical or psychological records compiled by others, which
are not admitted into evidence, that decision is no longer to be given effect.
Id.
21. See note 18 supra.
22. This problem is raised by the adoption of Rule 703. Under the traditional rule, the
data used by the expert in arriving at an opinion had to be admissible into evidence. When
that data was introduced the court would, upon proper objection, consider the data in
light of relevancy standards, the best evidence rule, and other exclusionary policies. If the
data need not be introduced, the question arises whether the trial judge should apply those
rules to the basis of an expert's opinion.
23. There is a type of data to which the traditional rule never applied. All experts must
be qualified as such in order to render an opinion. Mahlstedt v. Ideal Lighting Co., 271
Ill. 154, 110 N.E. 795 (1915). This is normally accomplished by reciting the education and
experience of the witness in the particular field. However, much of the information ob-
tained by the witness that made him an expert is not provable at trial. Further, it is
axiomatic that the expert relies on this prior education and experience in arriving at an
opinion. Of course, it would be ridiculous to attempt to say that all educational and
experiential background factors must be provable at trial. Were that the case, no one
would ever be able to render an expert opinion, and practically all courts have so recog-
nized. See the cases cited in Rheingold, supra note 8.
The only time the traditional rule was thought to be applicable was when an expert
referred to some specific past event in his experience as part of the basis of his opinion.
Here it seems that Rule 703 would clearly allow the use of this past incident over any
hearsay objection. Experts always compare present situations with past situations. The
isolation of individual past situations is simply classifying the general past experience,
which itself is already an acceptable basis.
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APPLICATION OF 703 TO CERTAIN TYPES OF DATA
Admissible Data
One aspect of Rule 703 is often overlooked. Properly applied,
the Rule should save a considerable amount of trial time. The
Rule not only allows the expert to rely on inadmissible data, it
also permits him to base an opinion on data which although
admissible is not offered in evidence. Thus it no longer will be
necessary to call a large number of witnesses whose sole function
is to present the data to the trier of fact in preparation for the
expert's opinion.24 As was done in Ward, the expert simply may
give his opinion with the tremendous corresponding savings of
trial time and effort.
Medical Records
Much of the data upon which an expert relies can be classified
as hearsay. It is information received out of court and not subject
to cross-examination. Because of this lack of cross-examination,
some courts have refused to allow an expert to base an opinion
on specific out-of-court information. 5
Under one analysis, there is no problem in allowing the expert
to rely on out-of-court information. This line of reasoning cor-
rectly points out that the basis of an expert's opinion cannot be
considered hearsay. Out-of-court statements are only hearsay
when offered for the truth of the matter asserted in the state-
ment." The information relied upon by the expert is not offered
for its truth, but rather to explain how the expert arrived at his
opinion.2Y
However, most courts have recognized that when basis infor-
mation is presented to the fact-finder through the expert's testi-
mony hearsay dangers are present even though the information
is technically not hearsay. 8 The question then is the extent to
24. Advisory Committee's Comment to FED. R. Evm. 703.
25. See, e.g., Jenson v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 24 Ill.2d 383, 182 N.E.2d 211 (1962).
26. FED. R. EVID. 801(c); MCCORMICK, supra note 6, §246, at 584.
27. Several courts and commentators have agreed with this statement. Tierney v.
Charles Nelson Co., 19 Cal.App.2d 34, 64 P.2d 1150 (1937); J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1720
(3d ed. 1940); Ray, Testimony of Physician as to Plaintiff's Injuries, 26 TUL. L. REV. 60
(1951).
28. See, e.g., American Luggage Works, Inc. v. United States Truck Co., 158 F. Supp.
50 (D. Mass. 1937). The information forming the basis of a hypothetical question is
19771
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which Rule 703 allows an expert to use this hearsay-type informa-
tion.29 Rule 703 should allow the expert to use most hearsay-type
data, if the data is of a type that other experts in the field use
and rely upon in arriving at conclusions and inferences.
Of particular interest to Illinois is that the Rule allows the
expert to use hospital and medical records in arriving at an opin-
ion.30 Although Illinois does not view medical records as inher-
ently untrustworthy,3' they are not considered sufficiently relia-
ble to be regularly admissible as business records. Despite being
viewed as unreliable for legal purposes, it is undisputed that hos-
pital and medical records are essential to experts for purposes of
diagnosis and treatment. A doctor relies on x-rays and the inter-
pretation of an x-ray by a radiologist. A surgeon relies on reports
from other doctors as to a patient's ability to undergo surgery.
Doctors rely on statements in medical records from nurses and
others regarding the patient's progress and reaction to medicines.
Therefore, under Rule 703, a doctor or other medical professional
now should be permitted to use statements or writings from other
medical professionals in arriving at an opinion. Indeed, the point
is probably specifically covered by People v. Ward" which al-
lowed a psychiatrist to use statements by a psychologist in arriv-
ing at an opinion.3
normally presented, in an acceptable form, to the fact-finder, at another time during the
trial. When the information is used as the basis of an expert's opinion, it will have to be
accompanied by an instruction indicating the purpose for which this information is to be
considered, provided it is not considered hearsay. The possibility that a jury would be able
to follow such an instruction seems to be remote. See Advisory Committee's Note to FED.
R. EvID. 803(4).
29. Of course, if the information already qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule,
there is no problem.
30. See note 15 supra. Illinois has differed from most states as to the admissibility of
hospital and medical records as business records. While admissible in other jurisdictions,
they are inadmissible in Illinois.
31. Medical records may, under certain circumstances, be admissible as past recollec-
tion recorded or as an admission.
32. 61 Ill.2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975).
33. Much of what has been said concerning hospital and medical records also applies
to police records. The same rules that exclude hospital and medical records as business
records also apply to police records. See note 15 supra. However, insofar as experts would
normally rely on data contained in police records in arriving at an opinion, Rule 703 would
apply. The pertinent query would be directed to the type of data contained in the police
record. The fact that the data was contained in a police record should not mean that an
expert may not use it. Thus, there is a distinction between the past history of a defendant
contained in police files when used by a psychiatrist to arrive at an opinion on sanity, and
the report of a witness to an auto accident contained in a police accident report.
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Such an interpretation of Rule 703 does not mean that state-
ments from one medical professional to another are trustworthy
enough to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. The
Fifth Appellate District seems to have misconstrued Ward in that
respect. In Smith v. Williams,34 an attending hospital physician
testified that he sent the plaintiff to have a conference with a staff
psychiatrist. He then relied on the psychiatrist's report in pre-
scribing medicine for the plaintiff. The psychiatrist's report was
part of the basis of the physician's opinion at trial.
The court held that under Ward the psychiatrist's report to the
physician was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
While such a result may be desirable, it does not follow from the
Ward opinion. There is a clear distinction between data that is
trustworthy enough to qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule,
and data that is inadmissible but usable by experts in arriving
at an opinion because it is relied upon by experts in the field.
Statements Made to Testifying Physicians
Illinois has a long history of distinguishing between statements
made to a treating and a testifying physician for purposes of
admissibility as an exception to the hearsay rule. For example, a
plaintiff who has been injured in an automobile accident may go
to a physician for purposes of treatment. That physician is al-
lowed to testify as an expert at trial because as a treating physi-
cian he has first-hand knowledge of the patient's medical prob-
lems. While part of his information has been obtained from the
patient, that information is admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. 5
34. 34 Ill.App.3d 677, 339 N.E.2d 10 (5th Dist. 1975).
35. A statement made by a patient to his doctor is admissible on the theory that the
patient, in his desire to be cured, will not fabricate stories. Grieske v. Chicago City Ry.,
234 Ill. 564, 85 N.E. 327 (1908). Insofar as the statements are necessary for treatment and
diagnosis, they may relate to the cause of the accident and the manner in which it
occurred. Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 Ill.2d 590, 119 N.E.2d 224 (1954); Cuneo
Press Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 341 Ill. 569, 173 N.E. 470 (1936). Whether this rule
extends to statements made to the physician by the patient's parents is unsettled in
Illinois. Compare Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill.App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1st Dist.
1943) (admissible), with Behles v. Chicago Transit Auth., 346 Ill.App. 220, 104 N.E.2d
635 (1st Dist. 1952) (inadmissible).
Statements made to lay persons do not fall within the exception. Indeed, a lay person
cannot even testify as to the substance of a statement of pain and suffering. Lauth v.
Chicago Union Traction Co., 244 III. 244, 91 N.E. 431 (1910).
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However, before trial, the plaintiff may consult another physi-
cian solely for the purpose of having that physician testify as an
expert at trial. This second physician normally may not render
an opinion based on any statements made to him by the pa-
tient." He must give his opinion as an answer to a hypothetical
question since he is considered to have no personal knowledge of
the underlying medical problems. 7
Statements made to testifying physicians were barred by the
hearsay rule on the grounds that they were untrustworthy. It was
felt that the patient, envisioning a large damage award, would
probably exaggerate his symptoms to the testifying physician.,
The guarantee of trustworthiness of statements to treating physi-
cians, i.e., the desire to be cured, is not present in statements to
testifying physicians.
Under Rule 703, statements to testifying physicians still are
inadmissible in Illinois as an exception to the hearsay rule. How-
ever, testifying physicians should be able to use them in arriving
at an opinion.39 Although it may be true that a patient has an
36. A testifying physician can only testify to objective symptoms, and not subjective
symptoms, unless the physician testifies via the hypothetical question route. People v.
Hester, 39 Ill.2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968). This distinction between objective and
subjective symptoms has led to some absurd and irreconcilable cases. Thus, an inability
to flex finger muscles is a subjective symptom. Barnes v. Chicago City Ry., 147 Ill.App.
601 (1st Dist. 1909). However, the flexing of the knees and feet is an objective symptom.
Hirsch v. Chicago Consol. Traction Co., 146 Ill.App. 501 (lst Dist. 1909).
37. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
Statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and de-
scribing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or
the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar
as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
The Advisory Committee Comments on this section noted that:
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not within
its guarantee of truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted only for pur-
poses of enabling him to testify. While these statements were not admissible as
substantive evidence, the expert was allowed to state the basis of his opinion,
including statements of this kind. The distinction thus called for was one most
unlikely to be made by juries. . . .This position is consistent with the provision
of Rule 703 that the facts on which an expert testimony is based need not be
admissible in evidence if of a kind ordinarily relied upon by experts in the field.
38. Jensen v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 24 l1.2d 383, 182 N.E.2d 211 (1962).
39. This would require overruling some Illinois cases to the contrary. See, e.g., People
v. Hester, 39 Il.2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968), where the opinion of a testifying psychia-
trist was held inadmissible because based on interviews with the patient.
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interest in presenting only favorable data to the physician, the
physician is trained to take the bias of the patient into account.
Much of the data necessary for a diagnosis can be supplied only
by the patient, particularly in psychiatric diagnoses. Because this
data is heavily relied upon by experts in the field, the physician
should be allowed to use it in arriving at an opinion. Any diffi-
culty with the information conveyed to the expert, as well as the
expert's own bias, can be brought out on cross-examination of the
expert."
Scientific Tests and Devices
Experts may utilize certain scientific test results, techniques,
and statistics in their practice. Often the expert has no first-hand
knowledge as to the accuracy of the tests or statistics. For exam-
ple, a doctor may have a chemist perform certain tests on blood
or tissue. An architect may have a metallurgist perform tests on
material. At trial, the expert presents an opinion based on the
test results or statistics which may not have been admitted and
in some cases may be inadmissible. Because these tests are gener-
ally acceptable in the scientific community, clearly they could
form part of the basis of an opinion even if not offered into evi-
dence.
The use of statistics by experts is illustrated by the case of
People v. Gillespie." In that case the defendant was indicted for
robbery. There were no eye-witnesses. As part of an entirely cir-
cumstantial evidence case, the state introduced blood samples
taken from the scene of the crime, from the defendant's car, and
from the defendant. Upon analysis, the blood in all cases proved
to be type A with a positive rheumatoid arthritis factor. The state
then called a serologist who testified that statistics indicated that
only 2.7 per cent of the Black population would have blood of that
classification."2 The expert had no independent knowledge as to
40. Of course, it may be difficult for a jury to follow the instruction that a judge
probably would have to give at this point. It would have to be told that the information
conveyed to the physician could be used only for the purpose of showing how the expert
arrived at his opinion but not as substantive evidence. The jury's difficulty in making this
distinction would point to the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) as the most
desirable method of reform in this area.
41. 24 Ill.App.3d 567, 321 N.E.2d 398 (2d Dist. 1974).
42. The Gillespie case is unique in several ways. It is practically the only case in which
19771
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the accuracy of the statistics, which had been circulated by a
pharmaceutical company that supplied blood.
The court resolved the problem by declaring that the pharma-
ceutical statistics were independently admissible by analogy to
mortality tables 3 and learned treatises." This argument was but-
tressed by the court's observation that since the company had an
interest in supplying accurate information in order to stay in
business, these statistics could be considered trustworthy. Under
Rule 703 it probably is not necessary for the court to go so far.
The serologist had testified that these statistics were generally
relied upon by serologists. Thus, the requisites of Rule 703 would
be satisfied and the serologist could use the statistics in arriving
at an opinion.
Hypnosis
While the blood type data of Gillespie may be independently
admissible into evidence, there is some "scientific" data that
usually is not admissible. Information obtained through hypnosis
blood-typing has been used as an inculpatory factor. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1063 , §1
(1975). It is also practically the only case where percentages have been used as a method
of identifying a particular person or item.
There has been considerable discussion recently regarding the probity of using probabil-
ity theory as a method of identification. All courts have rejected its use, usually on the
grounds that there was no proof of the existence of the individual probabilities and that
there was no basis to show that the individual probabilities were mutually independent.
See People v. Collins, 68 Cal.2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). The Collins
court also pointed out that the balancing of numerical and non-numerical probabilities
was extremely difficult for the average juror and defense counsel.
Most of the problems were avoided in Gillespie. First, the expert testified only as to the
existence of certain blood-types in percentage form. He did not attempt to give an opinion
from the percentages as to the robber's identity. Second, there appeared to be independent
proof of the per cent of the population containing that particular blood-type. That inde-
pendent proof was the pharmaceutical figures noted in the text. Third, it was clear from
scientific studies that the factors were mutually independent.
However, there is still much to criticize in terms of the relationship of the testimony to
the defendant and to the sample population. As many commentators have pointed out,
mere comparison with a random man is relevant to identity, but alone it will not give a
probability of identity. See, e.g., Braun & Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of
Evidence, 1970 ILL. L. F. 23; Dodd, The Scope of Blood Grouping in the Elucidation of
Problems of Paternity, 9 ME. Sci. & LAw 56 (1969); Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian
Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HAav. L. REv. 489 (1970); Sweet & Elvins, Human
Bloodstains: Individualization by Cross Electroimmunodiffusion, 192 SCiENCE 1012 (1976).
43. Henderson v. Harness, 184 Ill. 520, 56 N.E. 786 (1900).
44. FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
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is illustrative of this category. A psychiatrist in arriving at an
opinion on the sanity of an individual may obtain certain infor-
mation from that individual by hypnosis. Generally, statements
obtained from a subject under hypnosis are not admissible into
evidence. 5 Scientific opinion is divided on the trustworthiness of
the techniques used for obtaining the statements and on the
trustworthiness of the statements once obtained. This lack of
scientific agreement generally would be enough to exclude such
statements if offered into evidence.4" However, an increasing
number of psychiatrists employ hypnosis as part of their treat-
ment. 7 Should this increasing reliance mean that a psychiatrist
could use such statements as part of the basis of an opinion?
Again it seems as if the psychiatrist should be allowed to do so.
Rule 703 does not require that all experts utilize the technique
before this particular expert may use it. It only requires that
experts in a particular field, e.g., psychiatry, would reasonably
rely on the technique. The increasing use of hypnosis as a method
of treatment and of obtaining information for purposes of treat-
ment should be sufficient for the purposes of Rule 703. Indeed, if
45. Most courts confronted with the question of the admissibility of opinion testimony
based upon statements induced under hypnosis have analyzed it either as analogous to
statements obtained through the use of the polygraph and truth drugs, see, e.g., People
v. Hiser, 267 Cal.App.2d 47, 72 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1968), or on the basis of supposed unrelia-
bility of statements made by a hypnotic subject. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Commonwealth,
214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974). But see People v. Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 382 P.2d
33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963) (admissibility rests within the sound exercise of discretion by
the trial judge); State v. Harris, 214 Ore. 224, 405 P.2d 492 (1965); Harding v. State, 5
Md.App. 230, 246 A.2d 302, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1968).
Not surprisingly, the controversy regarding the admissibility of expert opinion premised
upon hypnotically-induced statements reflects the unsettled state of the credibility of
hypnosis existing in the scientific areas of knowledge. Although the practice of hypnosis
is perhaps as ancient as human history, and the phenomena exhibited by subjects under
hypnotic influence is well-catalogued, the nature and source of hypnosis itself remains a
mystery to scientists as well as lawyers. See generally D. CHEEK & L. LECRON, CLINICAL
HYPNOTHERAPY (1968); E. FROMM & R. SHOR, HYPNOSIS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENTS AND
PERSPECTIVES (1972).
46. Cf. People v. King, 266 Cal.App.2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968). However, a
respectable opinion indicates that such lack of agreement should go to the weight of the
testimony as opposed to its admissibility. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, §203, at 491.
47. See, e.g., D. CHEEK & L. LECRON, CLINICAL HYPNOTHERAPY (1968); E. FROMM & R.
SHOR, HYPNOSIS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES (1972); Brunn, Retrograde
Amnesia in a Murder Suspect, 10 AM. J. CUN. HYPNOSIS 209 (1968); Conn, Is Hypnosis
Really Dangerous?, 20 INTERNAT'L J. CLIN. & EXPER. HYPNOSIS 61 (1972); and Hartland,
An Alleged Case of Criminal Assault Upon a Married Woman Under Hypnosis, 16 AM. J.
CLIN. HYPNOSIS 188 (1974).
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the trial judge found as a preliminary question under Rule
104(a),48 that an acceptable number of psychiatrists rely on hyp-
nosis for purposes of treatment, then an opinion using informa-
tion so obtained should be admissible. 49
Polygraphs
A more extreme situation concerns the use of the polygraph or
lie detector. Virtually all courts agree that the polygraph has not
achieved sufficient trustworthiness for its results to be admitted
into evidence.5" Assume, however, that a psychiatrist wishes to
test certain statements made to him by the patient and suggests
that the patient undergo a polygraph test. The psychiatrist then
uses the results of the test to evaluate the patient's statements
and to form an opinion as to the patient's sanity.
It appears that Rule 703 would not cover such a situation.
There is nothing in psychiatric literature indicating that lie de-
tectors are an acceptable or reasonable means for evaluating pa-
tients' statements. The only indications of reliability are given by
a different field, i.e., the polygraph operators themselves. Their
agreement is not sufficient to render polygraph results acceptable
for psychiatrists' use. There would have to be some indication of
their increased use and reliance by psychiatrists in order for poly-
graph results to be acceptable as the basis of an expert opinion
on sanity.'
48. FED. R. EvID. 104(a) provides:
Preliminary questions concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court. . . . In making its determination it is not bound by
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
The procedure is the same in Illinois. People v. Guido, 321 11. 397, 152 N.E. 149 (1926).
49. How many is an acceptable number is something best left to the trial court's discre-
tion. The only thing that is clear is that the expert must show that experts other than
himself also rely on the same technique.
50. See, e.g., State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); Skolnick, Scientific
Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961).
However, one recent case has admitted polygraph results. United States v. Riddling, 350
F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
51. This does not mean, however, that the expert's opinion is inadmissible. If the use
of the polygraph is only incidental and not essential to the psychiatrist's opinion, the
references to it could simply be stricken. This would be particularly true if the psychiatrist
independently arrived at the same result as the polygraph. The mere use of the polygraph
does not make the opinion inadmissible per se. It would only do so when the polygraph




Adoption of Rule 703 raises the question whether other exclu-
sionary rules should militate against allowing an expert to use
certain types of data, even if the trial judge finds that such data
generally is relied upon by experts in the field. This problem did
not arise under the traditional rule. Under Rule 703, however,
data may be communicated to the trier of fact when the expert
testifies as to the basis of his opinion. This data, if introduced
substantively, might be subject to an exclusionary rule. The ques-
tion raised is whether the data also should be excluded when it
is part of the basis of an expert's opinion.
Prejudice
One of the most common reasons for excluding otherwise pro-
bative data is that the probative value of the evidence is out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect.52 Thus, courts commonly
exclude evidence of the defendant's past crimes unless the proba-
tive value of the evidence for issues other than the defendant's
character is clearly established.53
Should an expert be allowed to use such information in forming
an opinion? For example, could a psychiatrist use the defendant's
past criminal record as a factor in determining the defendant's
sanity. Here there is no question whether the data is the type
psychiatrists rely on in arriving at an opinion on sanity. The
problem presented is whether the fact-finder can be trusted not
to misuse the data and to convict the defendant on the ground
that the data shows the defendant to be a person who ought to
be incarcerated regardless of guilt or innocence of the crime
charged.5 This exclusionary rule should not necessarily prevent
52. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
For an exhaustive treatment of this concept, see Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in
Evidence, 49 So. CAL. L. REv. 220 (1976). For an analysis of how the concept operates in
one area see Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Time for Reform, 18
DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1968).
53. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
54. An Illinois case raising this question is People v. Graham, 25 Ill.App.3d 853, 323
N.E.2d 441 (3d Dist. 1974). The state's psychiatrist testified that he had received a report
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the expert from using the data. Admissibility usually is deter-
mined by balancing the probative value of the evidence against
the undue prejudice arising from the evidence. Thus, the need for
the expert's opinion must be balanced against the possibility of
prejudice to the defendant.
It is axiomatic that the probative value of a piece of evidence
rises or falls depending on the purpose for which it is introduced.
Thus a piece of evidence may be admissible for one purpose but
not for another. 5 This doctrine of alternative admissibility is the
cornerstone of relevancy and is essential to the operation of the
evidence system.5" The jury is instructed for what purpose it
may use the evidence, and it is generally assumed that it is capa-
ble of following those instructions. The present problem is merely
one more example of a case in which the jury should be instructed
to use the evidence only for the basis of the expert's opinion and
not as substantive evidence of guilt or innocence.57
Illegally Obtained Evidence
Some evidence is excluded, not because it is prejudicial, but
because it was obtained illegally, in violation of the United States
Constitution.58 Should constitutional considerations require the
exclusion of an expert opinion based on data that would be ex-
cluded for constitutional reasons if offered substantively? Cer-
tainly violation of the Fourth Amendment or the Miranda rules
does not foreclose use of the data for all purposes." In determining
of the "charges and happenings." The court felt that it was clear in this case that the
expert had used only that part of the report that was brought out by witnesses at trial. In
addition, the defendant did not cross-examine the expert to determine whether he had
used any other part of the report. It is unclear what the result would have been had the
expert used the defendant's past criminal record in arriving at his opinion.
55. People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Il1. 411, 104 N.E. 804 (1914).
56. See James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CAL. L. Rev. 689 (1941).
57. This does not mean, of course, that the opinion based on the defendant's record is
always admissible. Ordinarily the balance should be struck in favor of admissibility.
However, there may be cases where the probative value of the expert's opinion is very low
and the prejudicial effect of the opinion based on the defendant's past record is very high.
In these cases it would appear that the trial judge has the discretion under Rule 403 to
exclude the evidence.
58. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
59. Cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), where a statement taken in violation
of the Miranda standards was admitted to impeach a testifying defendant.
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whether to admit an expert's opinion based on such data a court
should consider the following factors:
[One] factor will be whether the doctor's opinion can be given
without revealing the illegally obtained information to the jury,
or stultifying cross-examination. Another matter to be consid-
ered is whether the deterrence value of the rule of exclusion is
not greatly affected, as, for example, if the violation was not
deliberately designed to obtain information for the expert. The
importance of the issue and of the expert needs to be considered.
A certain psychiatrist may be a critical witness on a sanity issue
while an accidentologist may not be.1
Thus, the conclusion here is the same as that reached in consid-
ering prejudicial evidence. The trial judge has the discretion to
exclude if the dangers inherent in the reason for the exclusionary
rule outweigh the need and probative value of the expert's opin-
ion.
Other Exclusionary Rules
Occasionally a writing is excluded from evidence because it is
not an original and the proponent of the writing cannot account
for the original's absence." This "best evidence" objection should
not prevail when directed against the basis of an expert opinion.
Any questions of accuracy that would arise because the expert
considered data contained in a carbon copy of a report could be
brought out on cross-examination.
Other exclusionary policies relate to the foundation necessary
to admit "real evidence" as opposed to testimony. The proponent
of the item must establish a chain of custody for the item before
it is admissible. This assures the fact-finder that the item intro-
duced is the same as is in controversy."2 In addition, if the condi-
tion of an item is relevant, the proponent must show that it is in
the same condition now as it was at the time of the incident.6 3
Traditionally, these rules were thought to apply to the basis of an
expert opinion. Therefore, if an opinion was based upon examina-
60. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & R. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 703-16 (1975).
61. FED. R. EVID. 1002; E. B. Conover & Co. v. Baltimore 0. S. W. R.R., 212 Ill.App.
29 (3d Dist. 1918).
62. People v. Berkman, 307 Il. 492, 139 N.E. 91 (1923).
63. Chicago Term. Trans. R.R. v. Korando, 129 III.App. 620 (1st Dist. 1906).
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tion of an object, it was necessary to show that the object was the
one in question and that its condition was unchanged.
It would seem that Rule 703 leaves unchanged the chain of
custody requirement. An expert opinion must still be relevant. It
is not relevant until it can be shown that the opinion was based
upon an examination of the item in question. Independent evi-
dence of that fact still is necessary.
However, the "no change of condition" requirement may be
modified by Rule 703. If it can be shown what changes have taken
place and if the expert can take those changes into account, the
opinion should be allowed. The court at the preliminary question
stage would have to determine whether the item is so changed
that any expert opinion would be valueless, or whether the change
would have only a minor effect upon the ability of the expert to
give an opinion. If the latter, any changes in condition can go to
weight as opposed to admissiblity.6 4
Untrustworthy Data
The Comment to Rule 703, in discussing the type of data rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in the particular field, indicates
that this language would not warrant admitting an opinion of an
accidentologist concerning the point of impact based on by-
standers' reports. There is some question as to the rationale of the
Advisory Committee's Comment. Under one interpretation, the
Committee simply could be noting that accidentologists do not
rely on statements of bystanders. Therefore, if such an expert
purports to do so, he is attempting to use data not relied upon
by experts in the field. The difficulty with this interpretation is
that if the bystander testified in court before the expert, the
expert could use that testimony along with other data in arriving
at an opinion. Thus, it is data that accidentologists sometimes
use. However, if the bystander does not testify, the accidentolo-
gist may not include his statement among the data the acciden-
tologist considers.
This suggests that the Advisory Committee feared that expert
opinions will be substituted for eyewitness testimony. Eye-
64. Cf. Gieke v. Chicago Great W. R.R., 289 IIl.App. 45, 6 N.E.2d 690 (1st Dist. 1937),
where the court noted that if the change in condition did not affect the probative value of
the item, it would be admitted.
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witness testimony is important, but it is subject to influences
relative to the background of the witness. These background fac-
tors can be brought out on cross-examination, but only if the eye-
witness testifies. Thus, the Advisory Committee Comment may
indicate that cross-examination of eyewitness testimony is neces-
sary because the winnowing of the information through the men-
tal process of the expert does not sufficiently guarantee trustwor-
thiness of the testimony.
If this is the case, then a possible further limitation is placed
on the data usable by the expert. That is, even if the data is relied
upon by experts in the field, the court may find that the data is
legally untrustworthy unless the witness supplying the data is
available for cross-examination. In considering this question, the
court should balance the need of the expert to rely on this data
against the hearsay dangers inherent in uncross-examined testi-
mony. Thus, for example, it has long been recognized that medi-
cal professionals must use statements from lay people in order to
render treatment adequately. The medical profession considers
such statements to be reliable." The same is true regarding the
use of background data supplied by lay people in condemnation
valuation cases."6 In these areas the need clearly outweighs any
hearsay dangers. On the other hand, there may be situations in
which the court may consider the hearsay dangers so great that
it would not admit the opinion unless the person who conveyed
the data to the expert is available for cross-examination. This
situation might arise, for example, when the expert utilized data
contained in a business record supplied by a person with no busi-
ness duty to report accurately, 7 a business report prepared for
litigation,"8 or a police file prepared for trial." Other examples will
have to await future litigation.
65. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
66. See, e.g., District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency v. 61 Parcels of Land, 235 F.2d
864 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
67. Courts have interpreted statutes admitting business records as an exception to the
hearsay rule to require that the information be supplied by a person with a business duty
to report accurately. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
68. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); MCCORMICK, supra note 6, §308, at
723. This view seems to have been adopted by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) which
would not admit records of regularly conducted activities when "the source of information
or the method of circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness."




It is clear under the Federal Rules of Evidence that the ques-
tions whether the data used by the expert is relied upon by other
experts in the field and whether any other exclusionary rules
apply to that data, are preliminary questions for the judge. If the
basis of the opinion is appropriate, then the opinion will go to the
fact-finder; if not, it will be excluded.
This puts the trial judge in a somewhat anomalous position.
The judge must decide whether the expert made use of reliable
data in a field that ex hypothesis the judge knows nothing about."
Normally, the testifying expert will have to be relied upon for a
determination of what data is usable. In case of doubt, however,
other experts could be called and learned treatises consulted to
cast light on whether the data used by this expert is of the type
relied on by experts in the field. If the question is a close one, the
judge should admit the opinion and any further questions as to
the data used by the expert should go to the weight to be given
the expert's opinion.
Thus, the adoption of Rule 703 allows greater flexibility in the
use of expert opinions. In that it re-rationalizes and simplifies the
entire area, People v. Ward is an excellent first step toward re-
forming the rules of expert testimony in Illinois. Unfortunately it
is only one step. Taken in isolation the adoption of Rule 703 raises
certain questions.
Rule 703 is one section of a complete restructuring of the rules
concerning expert testimony in the Federal Rules of Evidence. It
is bolstered by several other sections, in particular Rule 7051, and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4).72 Together these rules
70. The judge has the same difficulty in passing on the preliminary question under
Federal Rule 803(4). Statements to a physician are admissible if reasonably related to
diagnosis and treatment. To a large extent, the judge will have to rely on the physician's
statement of the relationship.
71. FED. R. EvID. 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) provides:
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by
experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be
obtained only as follows:
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assure adequate presentation of the basis of an opinion, should it
be required by the fact-finder, and assure adequate cross-
examination of the expert by providing for discovery of expert
witnesses. However, absent these safeguards, what will guarantee
that the basis of the expert's opinion is reliable if an expert is
allowed to base an opinion on matters not in evidence and not
subject to cross examination? 3
The reliability of the basis of the expert's testimony supposedly
is assured by the second sentence of Rule 703, which restricts the
expert to data reasonably relied upon by experts in his particular
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to iden-
tify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at
trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and
to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected
to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the
court may order further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions
as to scope and such provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule,
concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litiga-
tion or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at
trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circum-
stances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain
facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that
the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in
responding to discovery under subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this
rule; and (ii) with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii)
of this rule the court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under
subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking dis-
covery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably
incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for extensive discovery of experts,
but do provide for discovery of "examinations and tests." FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D).
While this offers less information than would be obtained through Civil Rule 26(b)(4),
it enables a defense attorney to anticipate the data an expert might use in formulating
an opinion.
73. This problem becomes acute when the expert relies on descriptive reports of others.
There is no way to cross-examine those reports and severe hearsay dangers may arise.
Cross-examination could disclose: what information the witness intends to convey to the
trier of fact by the witness' language; the sincerity of the witness; the extent to which what
the witness testifies to is the product of his own memory or the adoption of the experience
of others; the extent to which what the witness testifies to corresponds with what was
actually capable of perception. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 142-43 (1956). As
the Illinois Supreme Court noted, "[T]he hearsay statements may be true without the
related facts being correct." People v. McCoy, 44 ll.2d 458, 256 N.E.2d 449 (1970).
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field. Presumably, then, if the expert used data other experts
would not rely upon, the opinion would be inadmissible.7'
This, however, may not be an adequate guarantee of reliability.
At the time the Ward case was decided there was some confusion
as to whether Illinois provided for discovery of expert witnesses."
Without discovery an expert could have been called and given an
opinion never before heard by the opposing attorney. The result
would have been ineffective cross-examination of the expert opin-
ion and its underlying factors.
Fortunately, the Illinois General Assembly recently passed a
statute providing for extensive discovery of expert witnesses."
This reflects the federal position contained in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(4). 71 The expert's deposition can now be
taken early in the litigation and extensively analyzed before trial.
Thus, when the expert testifies at trial his testimony can be ex-
haustively critiqued. This removes all objections of unfair sur-
prise and lack of cross-examination, in addition to illuminating
the technical problems presented by the lawsuit.
One reform that is needed is a change in the manner of present-
ing expert testimony. With the adoption of Rule 703, there is no
longer a need for the hypothetical question. The original purpose
of the question was to elicit the basis of the expert's opinion in a
non-objectionable manner. Now the expert's opinion no longer
74. This may answer the contention raised in the preceding note. The Supreme Court
Advisory Committee noted that Rule 703 would not warrant admitting the opinion of an
"accidentologist" based on statements of bystanders. Presumably this is because of the
hearsay dangers inherent in the uncross-examined statement of an eyewitness.
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §58(3) (1975) only provided that a party furnish the names
and addresses of persons he intends to call at trial. However, Sup. Ct. R. 201b(1) (1975)
permitted discovery of "persons having knowledge of the relevant facts." It was unclear
whether experts were covered by these provisions or not. See Hurby v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 11 Ill.2d 255, 142 N.E.2d 81 (1957).
76. The General Assembly passed Public Act 79-1434, approved September 1976,
amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §58(3) as follows:
A party shall not be required to furnish the names or addresses of his witnesses,
except that upon motion of any party disclosure of the identity of expert wit-
nesses shall be made to all parties and the court in sufficient time in advance
of trial so as to insure a fair and equitable preparation of the case by all parties.
(emphasis added)
This brings civil practice in line with the Supreme Court Rules regulating discovery in
criminal cases. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §412(a)(i) and (iv) provides for the discovery of
expert witnesses, their reports and tests, and the substance of their statements.
77. See note 73 supra.
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must be based solely on admissible evidence. Thus, there is no
reason to retain this confusing and often abused practice.
Federal Rule 7058 leaves the manner of presentation of the
opinion to the discretion of the trial court judge. This provides the
trial judge with the means to simplify the conduct of the trial in
addition to making the experts more understandable to the fact-
finder. Some version of Rule 705 should be adopted by Illinois.
Indeed, we can hopefully envision that the direct examination
of an expert, after being qualified, can proceed as follows:
Q: Doctor, do you have an opinion based upon a reasonable
degree of medical certainty as to the extent of permanent disa-
bility suffered by the plaintiff as a result of this automobile
accident?
A: Yes.
Q: What is your opinion?
A: She is totally permanently disabled.
Q: Thank you doctor, that is all."
It is submitted that most members of the bench and bar would
joyfully welcome this reform.
78. See note 71 supra.
79. Hearings on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on
Reform of Federal Criminal Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 2, at 355-56 (Supp. 1973).
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